Introduction
Due to the popularization of smartphones and tablets, electronic payment services and data sharing applications using NFC (Near Field Communication) are attractive.
For the secure near field communications, it is highly desired to exchange devices' keys to avoid eavesdropping by an attacker. One of the most common key exchange schemes is the well-known DH (Diffie-Hellman) scheme in which two devices surely exchange their own keys via a communications channel [1] . However, in a NFC, the DH scheme is vulnerable to MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks where an attacker and a nearby located victim ex-
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change keys with both devices [13] . In this attack, the victims do not recognize that the keys have been exchanged with an attacker. The reason why DH scheme fails in a NFC setting is that an attacker may transmit and receive messages over the air. In general, it is difficult to control the level of the transmission power so that only legitimate devices can communicate. Hence, it is useful to employ a key exchange scheme which does not require the use of any wireless communications.
In this paper, we propose a vibration-based key exchange among multiple smart devices on the desk. We leverage a desk as a communication channel and keys are propagated by vibration. The basic idea is that, since vibration on a desk propagates over very short distances, only closely placed devices can reliably receive its signal.
Specifically, a key is converted into vibration patterns and both devices vibrate with the patterns and measure them with their accelerometers. In doing so, we first propose a key exchange scheme with two devices and then extend it to the three devices case. The whole scheme is implemented with Android smartphones in order to evaluate its overall performance and effectiveness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, previously published related work is presented in Section 2. The proposed scheme is described with details in Section 3. Various performances evaluation results and their interpretation can be found in Section 4. Finally, the conclusion of the paper are presented in Section 5.
Related Work
For securing the communication in close proximity, many authentication schemes verifying that legitimate devices are actually closely placed have been proposed. Such schemes are characterized by the following two important technical requirements: (i) legitimate devices can measure the same information and (ii) a device which is not in the proximity should not be able to observe the same sensory information. To meet these requirements, two authentication approaches exist. The first one is sensor-based authentication while the second one is motion-based. Next we will be presenting a literature review for both of these approaches.
Sensor-based Authentication
In recent years, smartphones' sensor modules, e.g., GPS, accelerometers, microphones and light sensors, have received a lot of attention and thus various sensor-based authentication schemes have been proposed by industry and academia alike [3, 4, 6, 15, 11, 7, 10, 8, 14, 16, 12, 9, 2] .
Based upon their employed sensor type, they can be classified into various sensor types: (i) temperature [11, 15] , (ii) acceleration [12, 8, 9, 2] , (iii) location information [6, 14] , (iv) RF (Radio Frequency) signals [14, 7, 16] , (v) audio [3, 4, 10, 14] , (vi) light [3, 4, 10] , (vii) exhaust gas [11] , (viii) humidity [11] , and (ix) altitude [11] . Halevi et al. proposed a secure proximity detection scheme for a NFC enabled mobile payment system [3, 4] . For these schemes, audio and light measured with smartphones are used as location information in order for the authority to check whether a device is truly used for payment. Ma et al. proposed a geographical authentication scheme using GPS or WiFi-based positioning system [6] . In that proposal, a device verifies the proximity of a communicating device with GPS information. Urien Although above schemes do not use wireless communications for authentication, it is difficult to control the valid range of two devices. For example, when light or audio information are used for authentication in in-door environments, an attacker who is present in the same room, might be also authenticated since he/she can obtain valid information. Therefore, schemes using light information or the strength of a radio wave of Wi-Fi are suitable for an authentication for several smart devices which are closely located in the same place, e.g., in the same room or floor.
On the other hand, they are not appropriate for an authentication for payment.
Motion-based Authentication
In recent years, methods for determining whether or not two smart devices are in close proximity, say within 1cm, have been proposed. For example, Mayrhofer et al. proposed a secure pairing with accelerometer [8] . In that scheme, two devices are first placed back-to-back by a user and then they are shaken to sense the same acceleration. Mehrnezhad et al. proposed a NFC payment system preventing MITM attacks by using acceleration [9] . A user bumps his/her smartphone to a register, and both the smartphone and register measure acceleration. If the measured values are similar, the smartphone is authenticated for payment. In another approach, Gu et al. proposed an authentication scheme between two smartphones using vibration [2] . More specifically, when two smartphones are touched together, one of them vibrates randomly while the other measures acceleration.
All the above mentioned schemes focus on sharing the same measurement among the legitimate devices. Although authentication is required prior to the message transmission, however, in reality, a key exchange phase is required for securing the transmitted message. One of the most common key exchange methods is the DH scheme where two devices surely exchange their own keys via a communications channel [1] . However, the DH scheme when it is used in wireless communications links, it may fail due to the vulnerability against MITM attacks [13] .
For example, a victim might exchange its key with an attacker and then another victim does exactly the same, both of them without realizing it. In this case, both victims surely exchange their own keys, but at the same time they do this also with the attacker. Therefore, a key exchange scheme without the use of a wireless communications link is highly desired.
The Novel Scheme
We will introduce here a novel vibration-based key exchange among multiple smart devices on the desk. The main idea behind this scheme is to leverage a desk as a communication channel. The reason why we choose vibration as a communication medium is that a wave can only propagate on a general desk and its communication range is very short. As we will show later, even if an attacker's device eavesdrops 1cm away from legitimate devices, the secret key cannot be recovered. In our scheme, devices exchange their keys via a desk in which they are placed. A key is converted into a vibration pattern and a device vibrates with its pattern. The other device extracts the sending device's key by measuring acceleration. We first propose the key exchange scheme with two devices.
In the two devices case, each device vibrates and measures the acceleration at the same time for speeding up the key exchange. Although the two vibration patterns are mixed, each device can guess the acceleration change caused by its own key. We then extend this idea to accommodate In the following, we first describe the system model and then the detailed algorithm.
System Model
The proposed key exchange scheme requires three entities: smart devices, e.g., a smartphone, tablet cash register, and a desk. We also assume that smart devices are equipped with a near field wireless communication module e.g., BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy), an accelerometer module and a microprocessor to process measurement data. Note that a wireless communication module is required to transfer data encrypted with an exchanged key after the keys have been exchanged. We assume that the two devices, d 1 and d 2 , are on the table next to each other in the two devices case. An additional device, d 3 , is also used in the three devices case. Let A j denote device d j (j = 1 or 2) 's three-axes acceleration from time 0 to T , where T is the measurement duration, which can be mathematically represented as: (a x,j,1 , a y,j,1 , a z,j,1 ), · · · , (a x,j,T , a y,j,T , a z,j,T )}.
Algorithm for the Two Devices Case
Because of the high sensitivity of the device's accelerometer A j , can be easily affected by even a small amount of vibration, which we will be referred to as noise. In [5] it was shown that such noise can be eliminated by selecting the following acceleration coefficients:
A z,j,t = 1 4 (−3a z,j,t−1 + 2a z,j,t + a z,j,t+1 ).
Clearly A x,j,t , A y,j,t and A z,j,t represent the three-axis acceleration measurements after such noise has been removed. In order to obtain high accuracy, the strength of acceleration is calculated with three-axis measurements A x,j,t , A y,j,t , A z,j,t as follows:
After the measurement, a key is recovered with the acceleration information. Since R j,t includes any possible internal error, I j,t , made by each device, the final R j,t is given by:
Although the device can't simultaneously measure both R j,t and I j,t , each device knows its own vibration pattern, so that it is possible to predict I j,t . Finally, binary data average of acceleration R j,t , so that the highest similarity can be achieved. Then, the recovered key k j,t will be obtained as follows:
After k j,t is recovered, device d 1 uses key k 2,t to encrypt a message to send to device d 2 . Then device d 2 will decrypt the massage by k 2 . Similarly, on device d 2 side, key k 1,t will be used to encrypt a message to device d 1 , and d 1 decrypts this encrypted message using k 1 . following vibration patterns and measure acceleration information at three devices. Here, we denote devices that vibrated first and second as P j and Q j , respectively. After the measurement, we use Eqs. (1)- (3) to eliminate the noise from P j and Q j and calculate the three-axis acceleration measurement using Eq. (4) and thus obtain R j,Pj ,t and R j,Qj ,t .
Algorithm for the Three Devices Case
From R j,Pj ,t , R j,Qj ,t , and I j,t , the three devices will recover their individual keys. For example, R 
Discussion
There are four advantages associated with the proposed scheme. The first one is that it generates a one-time 
Performance Evaluation and Discussion
We evaluate the efficiency and the performance of the proposed scheme with an Android phones Nexus 5 in a real environment. We used three Nexus 5s as smart devices.
As a preliminary experiment, we have first checked the feasibility of our scheme by specifying the vibration pat- After verifying that our scheme works in practice well, we evaluated its performance, namely the similarity of the binary data from expected acceleration and the binary data from the vibration pattern. The similarity, sim, is calculated as follows:
where ∧ denotes the logical multiply operator. We first evaluate the two devices case and then three devices case.
For the latter case, initially we make each device vibrate one-by-one, then make two devices vibrate simultaneously, so that the key exchange can be accomplished in two phases as it has been described in Section 3.3.
We also evaluate the similarity, sim, when an attacker which is placed 1cm away from two smart devices and by measuring their acceleration at the same time. Fig. 9(a) , the red and green lines show I 1,t and R 1 , respectively. Similarly, the blue and orange lines show I 2,t and R 2 , respectively. Although, the magnitude of I j,t and R j,t is different, R j,t is accurately converted to k j,t with m j . (7), the similarity between k 1 and k 1,t is 83%, and the similarity between k 2 and k 2,t is 86%. Since for the correct message decryption sim = 100% is required, a standard error correction scheme, such as BCH or ReedSolomon codes, should be used. This will achieve perfect similarity, i.e. sim = 100%, at the expense of increased processing time and complexity."
Vibration Duration vs. Acceleration

Acceleration of Two Smart Devices
Three Devices Case
We further evaluate the performance of our key exchange protocol for the three devices case. Fig. 10 shows the similarity sim (a) when three devices exchange their keys one-by-one, i.e. in three phases, and (b) when keys are exchanged in two phases as described in Section 3. Fig. 10(a) , we can see that sim = 84.6% is achieved when a device d i measures other devices, i.e., d j where i = j. Although this result is slightly worse than the two devices case, it suggests that our scheme can be still used in three devices case as long as the devices are physically attached each other. Then we discuss the similarity performance of the algorithm in two phases. Fig. 10(b) shows the similarity when three keys are exchanged in two phases. As expected, compared with the result in three phases, the averaged similarity degrades to 80.9%. In addition, from the result of d 1 and d 3 , we can see that the similarity degrades against the additional device. For instance, d 1 is more difficult to recover d 3 's key than d 2 's one, and vice versa. This observation leads us to the conclusion that, if we want to extend the proposed method to accommodate more than four devices, it is better for each device to vibrate and measure the pattern one by one. sured by an attacker and R 1 , respectively. As can be seen from these results, an attacker is not able to sense vibration to recover a key even if his/her device is placed 1cm away from a legitimate device. We also measure the similarity between attacker's and device d 1 's acceleration and it results in 53.6%. This means that the attacker's success probability is almost the same as random guessing, i.e., sim = 50%. From this result, we can conclude that an attacker cannot eavesdrop the key even if an attacker's device is placed in the vicinity of legitimate devices.
Attacker Recovery Performance
Conclusion
We have proposed a vibration-based key exchange among multiple smart devices placed on a desk, in which vibration and acceleration are used as communication medium for two and three devices to exchange secret keys. Since the proposed scheme does not require the use of radio signals it has the advantage of avoiding MITM attacks.
Various performance evaluation result have shown that the averaged similarity between two devices is 84.5% for the two devices case. In contrast, the similarity between an attacker's and device d 1 's acceleration was found to be 53.6%. This means that an attacker is almost impossible to eavesdrop the key even if the attacker's device is placed in the vicinity of legitimate devices. Furthermore, in the three devices case, the averaged similarity was found to be 80.9% which means that the proposed scheme still works well also in this case.
